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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L.B. FOSTER COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.NELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMP ANY, a Utah Corporation, and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMP ANY, a Corpora ti on,
Defendants and Appellants.

)
,
Case
No.10613

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
'l'his is an action by the plaintiff, who was a material snpplier of a Subcontractor, to recover for materials furnished and used in the construction of a portion
of Interstate Highway I-15, located in North Lehi, Utah.
Tli0 Snhrontractor was Bountiful Materials & Con-

strurtion Company, hereinafter referred to as "Bomaro.''
1

The General Co11trado1· ·was ~ elson Brothers Collstruction Company, hereinafter referred to as the "defendant Nelson Brothers.''
DISPOSrrION BY LOvVER COURT
This case was tried by the Court without a jury in
the District Court of Salt Lake County. The Court found
the issues in favor of the plaintiff.
Said the Court :
"That the plaintiff is entitled to reeover un<ler
the Indemnity and Guaranty Agrerment introduced in evi<lence, (Ex. P-1) and that the plaintiff is entitled to a ju<le,"lllent for the amount
prayed for, plus attorneys' fees as provided by
the Bar Schedule." (R. 49)
There was no issue on the amount owing to plaintiff for
materials furnislwcl ($2,752.90), since this sum was
agreed at the Pre-Trial conference.
Plaintiff and clef endant also agreed to a bide by the
Bar Schedule for the assessment of attorneys' fees (R.
43). Accordingly, judgment ·was entered for plaintiff
for the sum of $2,752.90, plus $3()3.83 interest, plus
$620.94 attorneys' fees, and plus costs of court (R. 53).
STATE.'.\lENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff (Respondent), as the pr0vailing party he]ow, is entitled to the benefit of a review of the eviclcner
in the light most favorable to it. \V r shall not attempt
here to set forth all of the evi<10nee hearing on ea('h iss1w
of fact.
2

Plaintiff's statement, however, is intended to demons! rate that the Court's ~fomorandum Decision (R. 49)
arnl thP Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, are
:imply supported hy competent evidence, and that the
.Tw1gnwnt represents a just determination of the controYers~'.

Defendant, Nelson Brothers Construction Company,
was m':anlrd a General Contract by the State of Utah to
co11f.Jrnct Highway Project No. IG-15-6 (20)-277-3rd
North, Lehi, Utah (Ex. P-1). In connection therewith
<1rfern1ant Nelson Brothers entered into a Subcontract
with BO:'.\L\CO, Inc., wherein BOMACO agreed to fur11isl1 mid install approximately 1,790 lineal feet of a1uminnm guard railing for said Interstate Project (Ex.
P-4). B0~1ACO in turn purchased the said aluminum railing- from the plaintiff and used it in the performance of
its Suhcontract with the defendant Nelson Brothers.
After BO:\IACO hecam_e unable to pay, plaintiff brought
t11is action to recover from defendant Nelson for the materia1s fnrnished and nsed on Nelson's Construction
Project.
:\f indfnl of the precarious financial position of BO:\f A CO, plaintiff wrote

to defendant from Los Angeles,

C1ilifornia, on June 10, 1063, as follows:
''~el son Brothers Construction Company
:i47 \Vest 16th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Subject: Project #IG-15-6(20)277 3rd
Contract North Lehi, Utah
Gentl0rn0n:
\Ye have heen re<iuest0cl hy your Subcontrnctor, Bountiful l\1aterials and Construction
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Company, to furnish aluminum bridge rail materials in cmmection with your ~Hate Contract, Project No. 1G-15-6(20)277-3rd Contract, North Lehi,
Utah.
In consideration of our drlil'f~ring aluminum
bridge rail to Bomaco, Inc., on your jobsite, we ask
that you guarantee payment of our im-oiee in accordance with the terms of your Subcontract with
Bomaco, Inc., and that ll"P be afforded prof Pcfio11
under your bond.

Your consideration in executing and rrturning
one copy of this letter to us in the self-ad<lressecl
envelope will be very much appreciated. Should
you have any questions, please call the undersigned collect.
V erv
. trulv.. .YOlll'S '
L.B. FOSTER, INC.
By /s/ K. D. l\IcClelland
K. D. l\fcC:lelland
Agreed as above.
N"ELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY
By /s/ Reuben G. Skogerboe
Reuben G. Skogerhoe, Superintendent
Date: October 17, 1963"
(Ex. P-1)

(Emphasis supplied)

The lower court a'\rnrded judgment to the Plaintiff,
L. B. Foster Company, on the basis of this said letter
agreement.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
'rHE COURT'S RULING THAT PLAINTIFF
\VAS NOT TRANSkCTING BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH WHICH WOULD
REQUIRE REGISTRATION UNDER THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT WAS
AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
This Court has spoken many times on the subject of
what ('011stitutes "doing business" in Utah by a foreign
corpora ti on.
On the subject of ''doing business,'' the facts, simply
stated, are these: Bomaco, defendant's Subcontractor,
placed its order for aluminum bridge railing from plain1iff for the X orth Lehi Project by telephone to plaintiff's
Los Angeles office (R. 126). Plaintiff in response to the
order had the bridge railing shipped from Pittsburg-Ii
PP1ms:dYania (R. 16) and Carnegie, Pennsylvania (R.
l~l) to Bomaco 's yard in Salt Lake City, Utah, in care of
(lefrll(lant Nelson. There is no dispute that all of the
materials ordered by Bomaco for this said highway proj(•d wrre shipped from states other than Utah (R. 100).
Plaintiff's salesmen infrequently solicited orders in
Utah -- on~y hrn or three times a year (R. 91). Plain1iff <fol not maintain ag-ents or dealers in Utah nor did
f)la i 11 ti ff ha ,.e an office or need for an office in the State
,,f Ptah (TI. 125). Plaintiff had nothing to do with the inc;1allr1tion of said matrrials after they were shipped to th<·
.ioh (R 101 ), hut did prepare shop drawings and did fah5

ricate the railing in Pittsburgh for delivery to the
Lehi Construction Project (R. 101 ).

~orth

Defendant Nelson urges that some sheet piliug stored
in Utah places plaintiff in the position of Qualification
and Registration. None of the said piling stored in Utah
·was used on the Xorth Lehi Project, and Shurtleff & }.nclrews, ·with whom the said piling was stored for the con,-enience of general contnictors, was in fact an irn1epern1ent contractor (R. 109). The record, l10wevt>r, is elem·
that almost all of the piling waf-3 shipped into the State
of Utah or throug-h the State in Interstate Commerce
(R. 111, 112).
Defendant Nelson's, witnesses testified at R. 145 and
146, that the sheet piling was receiYed from outside Utah,
and shipments were made to state's dher tlrnn Utah .
.Again, at R. 153, defrrn1ant Nelson'R witness stated, tlwt
of a total of seventeen transactions, thirteen were "shipped out of state or rerei,-ed from out of state, and fonr
·were shipped to or received within the state."
In addition to the interstate shipment of piling to independent contrad:ors Shurtleff & Ancln_~\YS am1 to F. &
B. Trurk Lines, it should be noted that plaintiff deals i11
rails, splice bars, holts, nuts, spikes, frogs, swift.hrs, tie
plates, rail braces, track, tools, '111 kinds of piping,
H-Bearinv,, pjpe pilin~;, marine fenders, rnh11er dork
fenders, pump cells, highway signs, nmie of ,,-11ieh an•
stored in the Stat0 of Utah nor sold through clealers or
ap;e11ts in the Rt ate of Utah (R. 141, JG~, 164-).
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Defendant Nelson does not attack the validity of the
agreement hetween plaintiff and Bomaco for the materials ordered and consumed on its job, but rather at page
12 of its brief urges "this court to uphold states' rights
to rompel compliance and should deny access to the courts
111 th is case." (Emphasis added)
Moreover, defendant Nels on does not contend the
lrn1cmnity Agreement (Ex. P-1) was either void or voidable for want of plaintiff's qualification in Utah.
so, the facts support the Interstate nature of
plaiHtiff's business in Utah. Upon these facts, the court
below follo-..ved the decision of East Coast Discount Cor]Jnratirm v. Reynolds, 7 Utah 2d 362, 325 Pac. 2d 853 .
.\rnl the Court had this case clearly in mind at the trial
of this said action. See the Court's comment with reference to this East Coast Discount Corporation case at
Page 110 of the record.
En~n

With reference to what constitutes doing business
within the meaning of the Constitution of Utah, Article
X, Section 9, see .~f arclwnt v. National Reserve Company
of T'tah, 103 Utah 530, 137 Pac. 2d 332.
Activities not considered to be transacting business
'':ithin the Rtate of Utah are set forth in 16-10-102, Utah
Co<le Annotated, under the Business Corporation Act.
Among these are:
(a) maintaining or def ending an~y action or suit ...
( <·) (•ffc,dinQ; sales throngh independent contractors (such
:1-.: tliP snles trmisaeted through Shurtleff & Andrews and
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R & B Trueking Company relating to piling <llil)-); (f)
soliciting or proenring orders, whethrr by mail or
through employees or agents, or otherwise, when' such
orders require accepta11ce "·ithont this State before
hrcoming binding eontrarts (plaintiff <lid not han
an office or an agency in the State of Utah for thP rrnrpose of acrepting orders in tl1is State); (i) transacting
any business in Interstate Commerce. (Practically all of
the business transacted hy plaintiff in Ftah 1\·a:, T11terstate, and the materials ordered from plaintiff was
shipped in Interstate Commerce.)
In the case of Parke Daris & Company v. Fift71 .711rlir'ial Distrirt C'o11rt, 93 Utah 217, 72 Pac. 2d 466, the
Court ruled:
"The soliciting of on1ers for goods h)' salesmen
of for0ig11 eurporati011 and the shipment of goods
into State pnrnuant to such orders, are in Interstate Commerce and do not constitute doin1~ bnsinrss within the Rt ate of Utah."
See also East Coast Discount Corporation v. Reynolds, 7 Utah 2d 362, 325 Pac. 2d 853, in which the Court
held that a foreign corporation which entered into contracts with dealers in the State of Utah 1\·hich required
it to send guarantees to consumers, adYertise<1 1hrongh
circulars, shared newspaper adYertising expe11sP, furnished a<lYertising mattPr, and send an a.gent 1Yhcn requested, to assist the dealer in sales, was not "<10inf(
husineRR'' for purposes of the statute; RincP these ads
were incidental to thr entire Interstate charart0r of
contracts.

8

The 1Jringi11g of a suit by a foreign corporation to
s1·1·11re its legal rights is not "doing business" in the
State of Utah. See George R. Barse Livestock Company
,.. Rangr Valley Cattle Company, 16 Utah 59, 50 Pac.
()30; Home Breicing Company of Chicago Il eights v.
A111rrican Chemical and Ozokerite Company, 58 Utah
21D, 198 Pac. 170; eneral Motors Acceptance C'orporatirm \'. JJ1md, 60 Utah 247, 208 Pac. 502.

r:

Def en clan t Nelson for "doing business" relies on the
case of Mud Control Laboratories v. Coi:ey, 2 Utah 2d 85,
2()9 Pac. 2d 854. In this case, the Court construed 16-8-3
Ftah Code Annotated (1953), setting out the disabilities
of a non-complying foreign oorporation. Defendant
N cl son, apparently overlooked the fact that 16-8-3 was
repraled by the Legislature in 1961, when the Utah Business Corporation Act was enacted. It should be noted,
lin\H":C'r, that in the Mud Control Case, contrary to the
fnets in the instant case, the materials sold by Mud
Control were shipped into Utah and were there disbursed by Mud Control. The Utah Business Corporation Act 16-10-102 liberalizes the registration requirements of foreign corporations, and specifically classifies
t hr 0xemptions 'd1ich come ·within the facts of this case.
Ree also East Coast Discount Corporation v. Reynolds,
s11pra, in which the Court said:
'' ... ~ferely entering into contracts requiring forei 1.rn corporations to perform within state acts,
whirh were part of and incidental to entire Interstate character of rontracts did not constitute
(1oim~· husi11rss for rrnrposes of statute.''
:;1 :

1

1'o s0t the rr('ord strni.~ht clefendant's voluntar~
t m"11t rlt 1)(1 !~·r 12 of its brief must he answered. De0
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fendauts' statement is quoted as follows:" Prcs1111wl;l!J, a
substantial sum has accrued to the State of Utah mid to
the County of Salt Lake for license taxes, sales taxes from
sales and lease transactions conducted in the State, income taxes from the income derived from said sales and
rentals, and the property taxes on i1wentory maintained
in the State." At page 129 of the record, plaintiff's
representative testified that he did not know whether
the company paid inventory, income or sales tax in Utah.
Defendant Nelson's counsel, it would appear, deliberately injected an assumption which this Court in its
judicious .wisdom ·will denounce. EYen though the sul1ject of taxes is entirely irreYelant to the issu0s in this
case, it would seem that the proper forum for defcnclm1t
N e1son to make its charge or complaint, if it has one, is
the State Tax Commission of Utah. Defendant did not
produc0 any evidence as to whether or not. plaintiff paid
taxes in the State of Utah.
In conclusion and in <lefense of <lefendant Nelson's
plea that the plaintiff should he denied access to the
Courts in Utah, we refer to 16-10-102 (a) Utah Code
Annotated, Utah Business Corporation Act, which specifically permits maintaining or defe11di11g any action or
suit or administrative or arbitration proceeding, or
affecting the settlement thereof, or the settlement of
claims or disputes without having to register in the
State of Utah.

10

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT DEFENDANT, NELSON BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION COMP ANY, WAS INDEBTED rro PLAINTIFF UNDER COUNT II OF
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
Defendant Nelson's argument to this point turns on
the authority of its superintendent Reuben Skogerboe,
to bind the defendant on an Indemnity-Guaranty Agreement (Ex. P-1, supra).
Having received the benefit of the materials furnished and used on its construction project, clef end ant
Nelson, for the first time and only after the law suit was
filed, took the position that Skogerboe had no authority to bind the defendant, Nelson Brothers. The Court
properly concluded that Superintendent Skogerboe had
the necessary authority, based upon the following:
1. Plaintiff's (L. B. Foster) letter, dated June
10, 1963 (Ex. P-1), was transmitted to defendant (Nelson Brothers Construction Compan,y),
requesting indemnification and protection under defendant Nelson's bond on Project IG-15-6
(20)277-3rd Contract, North Lehi, Utah. Defendant Nelson ref erred this letter to its superintendent, Reuben G. Skogerboe, who in
turn signed the document (R. 95), (R. 114,
115, 117), on October 17, 1963, and forwardcrl
the original to Plaintiff, L. B. Foster Company. It should he noted that Skog-erboe
signed the letter as "superintendent," and
11

not as ".Job Superintendent." By referri11g
this letter (Ex P-1) to Skogerboe for action
defendant conferred upon Skogerboe the authority to act.
2. On April 28, 1964, plaintiff, (Foster) wrote to
defendant (Nelson Brothers) (Ex. P-2) again
requesting payment on said job, and a copy
of this letter was directed to one of the principals in the company, Mr. Orrin A. Nelson.
Here again, Nelson Brothers referred this letter to Reuben Skogerboe, Superintendent, who
replied:
"Payment of materials on this contract has
not been received by us yet, payment should
be received hy us approximately May 20,
1964. \Ve will pa~- this to you and Bomaco
jointly. Payment has just been received by
us for material on the North Lehi Project,
so IG-15-6 (20) 277 this will he mailed immc>diately. Sincerely yours, Reuben Skogerhoc,
Superintendent." (Ex. P-2)
3. Exhibit P-3 is a telegram from this same Reuben Skogerboe stating that defendant, Nelson
Brothers, will execute a Standard Sheet Piling
Rental Agreement (R. 96, 97).
4. The Subcontract Agreement between defendant Nelson and Bomaco (Ex. P-4), was signed
by Reuben G. Skogerboe, Superintendent, for
and on behalf of Nelson Brothers Construction
Company (R. 97). Also Ex. P-5 was referred
to Skogerboe (R. 118).
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5. Reuben G. Skogerboe, Superintendent, ·wrote
to Bomaco on October 21, 1963 with reference
to this said North Lehi Construction Project,
in which he states that:
''. . . I am returning one set of drawings.
These dra.·wings do not have to be approved
by the State, to do so now it would delay the
project to such an extent you could not supply the material on time for delivery. The
State on]y requires a Certificate of Compliance v. '1.1 h plans and specifications, plus a
sample of handrail 2-feet Jong." (Ex. P-7)
"\Vould the Court need more to prove Skogerboe
had more than just superficial perfunctory jurisdiction of defendant Nelson's affairs?
fi. On December 22, 1964, the firm Clyde, Mecham
& Pratt "Trote to Emery Nelson of Nelson

Brothers Construction Company. referring to
the said Indemnity Agreement of .June 10, 1963.
There was no answer recei,·ed to this letter,
denying Skogerboe 's authority to sign the letter of June 10, 1963 on behalf of Nelson Brothers Construction Company (R. 27).

7. In answer to an interrogatory at R. 29:

"Q. Diel the defenclrrnt. N0Json Brothers
Construction Compan~'. have a Subcontract
with Bountiful "Makrials & Construction
Company.''
Emery G. Nelson of def0ndant Nelson Company
answered as the Secretary of the Corporation
that a written Rubcontrnrt "·as in existence an<l

furnished a rop)· of s:1icl Snhrontrnct with tlw
Answers to Interrogatories at R. 31. It is not0(1
that Skogerboe signe<l this document as "Snperinternlc>nt" for defomlant N"Plson, and that
Nels on did not ck11y Skogerhoe 's ant horit)· to
sign ::-;aid S111)('011trart document, arnl morco\·er
the materials fnrnisht>(l by plaintiff for performance of said Snhrontrnrt ~were nse<l on the
job (R. 98) and (R. ll 3).

8. Attached to defendant Kel:-wn Compan:•;'s Allswer to Interrogatories, Emery G. N c>lso11, S<·eretar)r of dc>fcmlant Nc>lson attaehc><l ehc•eks
paid on said SnlK·ontract for tlH• materials fnrnishc>d b)· L. B. Foster Company through Bomaco. ThPsc checks sl1ow part paymc>nt of 1110
account on the Subcontract exerutc•d h>· RenlJen
Skogcrboc (Attached to R-31).
9. On Seph•mber 28,

rnfi.+, dc>fendant

"t-~ elson

\\TOt(•

to plaintiff, stating that as of this elate, \\'e han•
paid our Subcontractor, Bomitifnl Materials &
Construction C1ompm1)·, $10,102.00 on the snhject contracts. This reprc>scnts 90 per rent of
the amount owed to them. The \Hiter of this
letter stated:
"We appreciate your informing llS of the unpaid balance of Bomaco 's account, and will
exert any pressure we can in getting- them to
make payment at the earliest clnte r)Ossih1e.
When we recein' final paymnt from the Stnt0.
we will make a check in the amount of
$1,128.00 payable to both you and Bomarn so
14

that you will be assured of receiving the final
amount owed to Bomaco by us." (Emphasis
added)
There is no indication in this said letter at R.
38, that defendant Nelson Company denies thr
authority of Reuben Skogerboe to enter into
the Subcontract Agreement with Bomaco.
:\foreover, defendant Nelson Brothers states it
will pay the ~1,128.00, 1rhicl1 has nnt been r701u.>,
to date a11rl it is holding this sum contrary to
the statcme11t in this said letter of 28 September 1.964. See R. 162, "·here Emery Nelson
states llefendant Nelson is holding $1,128.00.
Ser also R. 39, in which Bomaco, Inc., by a
Jetter dated October 30, 1964, authorized
<lefenclant (Nelson Brothers) Attention: Mr.
Emery Nelson, to pay $1,282.50 to L. B. Foster and Bonntiful Material & Construction
Company hy a joint check. Ancl, in answer to
the Demm1d for Admissions at R. 40, defendant (N rlson Brothers) admitted that the letter
of Se1)h'mber 28, 1964, signed h>· Owe11 J. Lunt
on he half of def emlant Nelson is g-enuine, Rnd
that Bomaco 's letter, elated Octoher 30, 1964,
\ms rrceiYrd hy defendant N0lson Brothers.
10. Defendant Nelson stipnlatecl at pages 79 and
80 of the rrconl that Renlwn Skofr0rhoe sig-11ed
thP ~nhcontract AgTerrn0nt with Bomaco n11 1
tlrnt Skogerhoe was n P,111wri11t0n<lrnt 1wer:nalifie<l ns snch with thr State of Ftah (R. 81 ).

1f)

11. Plaintiff, at no time e\·er recei,·ed information
from defendant Nelson that Reuben G. Skogerboe did not have authority to sign the Indemnity Agreement identified as Exhibit P-1
(R. 93).

12. Reuben Skogerboe testified that he had super\·ision of defendant N elsou 's '"'Ork and coordination of the work by general contractors arnl
was an expediter of matrrials on the job (R.
121). In this capacit~· he expedited materials
furnished by plaintiff.
13. Emery N elsou testified at R. 135, that Skogprboe had authority to negotiate tlw terms of
Subcontracts (R. 159).

14. The Suhcoutract Agreement signed by SkogNhoe \YaS Rnhmit t<•d to the State Road Commission by df>fendant Nelson, as heing completely
bona fide, and Nelson Brothers did not renounce this said Suh-contract because of the•
authority of Skog-erhoe (R. 161).
"The liability of the principal (<lefendant Nelson)
to a third person (plaintiff, Foster) upon n trm1sacti011
conducted b.v an agent ( Skogerhoe) ma~· he based upon
the fact that (a) agent was authorized; (h) the agent was
apparently authorized; or ( c) the agent had a power
arising from the agency relationship, and not dependent
upon an authority or apparent authority." (Restatcme11f
of thr Lmr of A.qency, Sec. 140.)
"Although an agent or apparent agent does not
under the n1les stated in Section 144-211 (disclosed or

partially disclosed 1irincipal) have power to bind his principal in a particular transaction, the transaction may
11en•rtheless subject the principal to liability or to the
loss of his interests where: (a) The principal has misled or has failed to undeceive the third person; (b) the
principal has benefited from the transaction." ... (Restatement of the Laio of Agency, Sec. 141.)
"Upon ratification with knowledge of the material
facts, the principal becomes responsible for contracts
and conveyances made for him by one purporting to act
on his account as if the transaction had been authorized,
if there has been no supervening loss of capacity by the
principal, or change in the law which would render illegal the authorization or performance of such a transaction." Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sec. 143.)
''A disclosed or partially disclosed principal is sub.ird to liability upon contracts made by an agent acting
within his apparent authority, if made in proper form
nn<l with the understanding that the apnarent principal
is a party. (ResfafPmPnf of the Law of A.qe11cy, 8ec.159.)

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S
FEE IN CONNECTION 'WITH COUNT II OF
THE COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff served notice upon the defendants on the
8th <lay of March, 1966, that plaintiff would ask the Court
1o amt>ncl the Pre-Tri al Ordrr at the commencrment of
the trial on l\farch 11, 1966.
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SinC'e the i8sne of attorneys' fee8 under Count II revolved upon an interpretation of th0 Indemnity Agn•0ment, and its relation to 14-1-8, Utal1 Code Arnwtated, the
Court saw no prejudice to defendant N elso11, in permitting the ame11dme11t. Defendants did not interpose an
objection to the Motion to Amern1 nnti1 the morning of
the trial.
ObYiously, the Court, nnder Rule 34 ( c) (1), conl<l
have awarded attorneys' fe0s (";en though plnintiff had
not proposed an amendment to the PrP-Trial Onler. rrhis
said rule proviues that " ... p\·ery final jrnl~·:m0nt shall
grant the r0li0f to whi('h th0 party i11 whOR0 fm·or it i"
rendered is entitled, eYPn if tlw p~rt.\· line: not d0mamlt>d
sueh rC'licf in his p1eaclings ... ''
The Court mrnnlecl attonwys' f0es to plaintiff on
the Indemnity Agre0mc•nt CF>;-. P-1 ), whieh proYided:
"In consideration of our (10liYering aluminum
bridge rail to Bomaec, Tne. on your johsite, we ask
that you gm1rm1tee pn:--·ment of our invoiee . . .
and that 1!'r br affnrdf'd /Jrnfer-tion 1111rlrr yn11r
bond." (Emplrnsis ad(l<'fl)
Protection under the honcl allows statutor:· attorneys' fees - the Court reasoned that the Inclemnit~·
Agreement granted nothing less to th0 plaintiff than thP
attorneys' fees allowable b:· statute under defendant N01son Brothers' bond.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO AWARD A REARONABLE ATTORNF,YR'
18

FEE TO DF~FENDANT, INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COlHP ANY.
Defendant, Industrial Indemnity Company, represpnkd by the same counsel, misconstrues 14-1-8. Attor1wys' fees are awarded to the party bringing the action,
if lw wins, and not to the party who does not bring the
act ion, if he wins. If the party bringing the action loses,
}ip f(ets no attorneys' fee.
The pre\'ailing party in the action was the plaintiff,
aml not the defendant, Industrial Indemnity Company.
Assume for argument, plaintiff won on Count I :md on
1
( ou11t II \rnuld the Court ha Ye awarded attorneys'
f c·<·s to plaintiff on ho th Counts - obYiously not. And,
too, attorneys' fees are taxed as costs under Rule
.)4(d) (1) to the pre\'ailing party, unlPss the Court nt71er1r i.c;c r1 i rccf s. Here, the preYailing party who brought
th<> action was plaintiff, and the Court so directed the
attorneys' fees. The matter of attorneys' fees \\'aS complet<>l.'' and exhaustiYely argued to the Court and the
(\mrt, acting within its discretion, mrnrcled same to the
pn'"\'ailing plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lo\ver court is supported by the
<·,·i<lt•nre and the law and should he affirmed.
Respectfully submit te(l,
ALLAN E. l\f ECH.A M
CLYDE, 1\fECHk'.\[ & PRATT
~51 South State Street
Salt Lake Cit:'. Utah 84111
Attor11r1/.<: for RPs1w11denf
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